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Abstract: Banking industry is traditionally seen as strictly regulated and driven to avoid political con-
text. While Russian economy in general lacks both well developed regulatory framework and political 
independence of business entities, we would like to analyze the current state of affairs in an industry 
for which these attributes have become a hallmark. As Russian non-resource-based industries in ge-
neral and the banking sector in particular are becoming more and more active players worldwide, the 
question arises, how exactly do Russian banks internationalize. We analyze four cases of international 
expansion by Russian banks in order to determine the main destinations for expansion, the entry 
modes used and whether they resemble resource-based companies in their internationalization. The 
results show that banks, even while being significantly state owned, are most likely guided by economic 
motives (as opposed to political ones), are leaning towards safer expansion destinations and are in 
several ways suffering from home market immaturity.
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introduction
First of all, as Russian economy is not only an emerging one (as opposed to developed) 
but an economy in transition, it is clear that historical context still plays a major role 
in the activities of Russian economic agents and, if correctly interpreted, may offer 
precious insights into their behaviour. However, in order to remain objective we will 
limit ourselves to those facts that can be interpreted unambiguously.
Outward foreign direct investments (OFDI) from Russia followed the growth trend 
of developed economies since the second half of the 20th century but with sub-par growth 
tempo, ending with Soviet firms having about 320 affiliates in foreign countries by 1983 
(Liuhto & Vahtra, 2007). These companies were often registered as joint ventures and 
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were mostly situated in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries; 
there were about 115 affiliates in OECD and 30 in developing countries; in 1990, the 
Soviet FDI stock abroad amounted to less than $1 bn. There is a strong possibility of organic 
international expansion having been constrained by environmental limitations.
The crash of the Soviet Union brought about disruptions in previous economic 
activities of the largest national enterprises. During the initial transition period which 
took about 10 years around 1990, they were mostly involved in restructurization and 
consolidation of assets inside the country. Several studies documented the process of 
transformation of these former state-owned enterprises (Filatotchev et al., 2007b; King 
et al., 1995).
The ‘catching up’ process that started in the end of the 1990s was mostly done by 
Gazprom and Lukoil (resource giants) with them accounting for around 90% of Russian 
assets abroad (The Russians Are Coming, 2006); other companies joined later, in early 
2000s. While Russia’s performance was then and is now more alike to the countries at the 
higher stages of development (according to the Investment Development Path (IDP) 
theory (Dunning, 1981; 1986), Russia’s FDI inflow should exceed outflow. However, 
the opposite was observed: $38.7 bn. inflow vs. 46.1 bn. outflow in 2009 according to 
UnctadStat), and several explanations of this fact have been developed by scholars.
One of them was based on the idea of oligarchical structure of Russian economy: 
a larger part of population that forms Russia’s overall profile is actually separated from 
most assets and capital which are controlled by oligarchy being able to behave like a 
‘state inside a state’ on a higher stage of development (Kalotay, 2006).
Another position maintains that it is the hostility of the home country business 
environment, on the one hand, and the home government incentives, on the other hand, 
that force and encourage Russian companies to go abroad (Panibratov & Kalotay, 2009).
However, with the main share of OFDI having taken the form of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions and greenfield investments present but in much smaller 
quantities, we might conclude that this state of things reflects the preference of Russian 
investors to go for quick returns and the lack of cumulative experience, which in turn 
indicates that until recently Russian OFDI were more of a quantitative phenomenon than 
a qualitative one, being a result of opening the ‘Kingston valves’ of Russian economy; 
whether it still holds true will be discussed below.
As for the banking sector, it also has some distinctive features that have historical 
roots. In the USSR, banks were established by the state for particular reasons in 
small quantites, thus enabling them to accumulate huge financial resources since this 
‘particular reason’ could authorize a single bank to keep private deposits of about 250 
m people or service international accounts of the entire soviet economy. This has 
resulted in a very high concentration level of current banking sector with several market 
leaders remaining from the soviet era and the latter having established ties (business, 
ownership, informal) with virtually every large Russian company set up before 1990s. 
Whether these ties have ‘swayed’ banks to behave like their partners or use the same 
expansion destinations, or had no effect whatsoever is another interesting question, 
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which, along with the main destinations and entry modes used by Russian banks, will 
be addressed in this paper.
The previous research on the issues mentioned above is virtually non-existent in 
Russian context, while the research dedicated to emerging economies in general 
sometimes led to controversial results, a good example of which could be the notions of 
banks following their customers or “paving the way” for them. Also, internationalization 
of Russian NRB (non resource based) industries has recently gained momentum 
and the fact that NRB companies account for 1/3 of Russian cross-border M&A 
purchases1 makes us think they might need to be studied separately from RB (resource 
based) companies. In turn, Russian banking sector is ranked 3rd after machinery and 
telecommunications in terms of foreign M&A purchases (UNCTAD Cross-border 
M&A database) with nearly 10% of foreign M&A accounted to them. Quantitative 
reasons aside, Russian banking sector is different from other NRB sectors in its high 
concentration and state control, which draws attention to Russian banks’ foreign 
activities and their peculiarities and raises suspicions about the similarity of banking 
to RB industries. This leads to a theoretical problem of allocating the banking sector to 
one of the industry groups, which is also addressed in this paper.
In our study we will analyze the cases of internationalization of four major 
Russian banks and based on this analysis make generalized conclusions on the 
internationalization process of the Russian banking sector, specifically on the main 
destinations, entry modes and the differences between banks and other Russian MNEs 
which are mostly large natural resource companies.
Theoretical background
While the theory of firm internationalization has been built to explain the motivations 
and strategies of firms from developed countries (mostly from Europe and the U.S.) 
expanding to developing markets, there have been attempts to test the applicability 
of the established concepts to explain the internationalization of companies from less 
developed markets.
The mainstream research in the field has focused on the amount of OFDI. Moreover, 
FDI outflows from emerging economies have been often taken as a proxy of activities 
of EMNEs (Filippov, 2008). Such approach could be challenged since the particular 
business motives and corporate strategies are neglected if studying Russian MNEs 
primarily from the perspective of their OFDI. Nevertheless, an increase of market-driven 
OFDI was expected already in 2005, as well as an increase of NRB companies’ share in 
total amount of outward investment (Vahtra & Liuhto, 2005).
Motives of EMNEs internationalization are considered to be the same as those of 
companies from developed economies with market, labour, resource and technology 
seeking prevailing over the rest (Rasiah, Gammeltoft & Jiang, 2010). In the case of 
1 We use M&A data as an indicator of foreign activity as there is no sectoral breakdown in Russian 
OFDI data
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Russia, resource and market seeking motives are most often stated as the main ones, 
but with little respect to industry specifics (Filippov, 2010).
In relation to Russia, a significant number of works contribute to studying general 
features of MNEs internationalization: they provide insights on possible adaptation 
of major FDI theories to current Russian environment, such as implementing an extra 
home economy factor into Dunning’s OLI paradigm, or try to give an explanation for 
the inconsistencies between theory-based expectations and reality. Unfortunately, they 
suffer from spreading findings from RB industries onto Russian economy in general and 
overlooking the evidence from NRB industries, which, as this paper intends to prove, 
is no longer acceptable. While the differentiation between RB and NRB industries and 
addressing one of them at a time can be traced back to the 1970-s (Kobrin, 1979), in 
studies dedicated to Russian MNEs a general approach is mainly used.
A lot of research in the area of RB industries is dedicated to relations with governmental 
bodies, as these industries obviously suffer from great political pressure. These relations 
become especially complicated when the host country is an emerging economy 
where legal framework can be very dynamic and RB industries are deemed extremely 
important by government (Makhija, 1993; Meyer, 2001). Newer studies admit the 
existence of economic motives behind Russian MNEs’ activities and their diversity 
(Filippov, 2010; Panibratov, 2009) but still address the process of internationalization 
of Russian companies as a mostly political phenomenon. Also, it has been noted that 
governmental policies regarding domestic companies going abroad in the past two 
decades have been becoming more and more encouraging all over emerging countries 
(Rasiah, Gammeltoft & Jiang, 2010)
Besides the importance of relations with host governments it has been noted that 
non-governmental organizations play an increasing role in affecting foreign expansion 
of RB companies as their activities are usually labour-intensive and having large 
environmental impact (Rugman & Verbeke, 1998; Ramamurti, 2004).
RB industries are the main subject or at least one of them in the majority of studies 
dedicated to Russian MNEs’ activities, even if it isn’t explicitly mentioned. This makes 
studies of Russian NRB industries’ internationalization really scarce; furthermore, 
there are no studies concentrating on Russian banks’ internationalization.
In general, banking is considered one of the most home-country oriented sectors 
due to legal restrictions and the nature of financial services (Rugman & Brain, 2004). In 
conjunction with the study by Dunning and Feng introducing the idea of institutional 
factors influencing the internationalization process of companies more than resources, 
capabilities and market factors (Dunning & Feng, 2008), this might provide insights 
into Russian banks’ foreign affairs.
Determinants of foreign banks’ presence and performance were studied by Dopico 
and Wilcox. Their research explored the correlation between the host economy factors 
(such as international trade, restrictions on foreign ownership, investment destinations, 
insurance and other activities) and their attractiveness for foreign banks and their 
performance (Dopico & Wilcox, 2002).
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International activities of banks from developed economies were studied by Qian 
and Delios in their article tying internationalization theory with experience of Japanese 
banks. It appears that in their foreign expansion Japanese banks rely mostly on their major 
clients’ actions and having experience in given host market only strengthens this reliance 
(Qian & Delios, 2008). However, there are works suggesting exactly the opposite, that 
Japanese banks follow their customers no longer (although they did so before) but 
actually pave the way for non-financial companies (von der Ruhr & Ryan, 2005).
The proposition of banks from emerging and developed economies competing in 
the same field was explored by Andreas Petrou. His research showed that while the 
motives of international expansion indeed are the same, the expansion destinations are 
significantly different and therefore the competition areas of banks from emerging and 
developed economies don’t overlap (Petrou, 2007).
Roolaht and Varblane studied the inward-outward dynamics in the internationa- 
lization process of Swedish banks, their conclusions about different outcomes of high 
and low levels of international experience seem to be applicable to Russian banks as well. 
According to their research, a situation when a relatively highly-experienced company is 
being purchased by an agent with similar or lower experience in international activities 
might lead to authority conflicts. Establishing subsidiaries as a main entry mode by 
Russian banks might be seen as a way of avoiding the latter (Roolaht, Valblane, 2009).
A serious research in order to model the determinants of US banks’ expansion, which 
appear to be the level of banking services, the number of subsidiaries, entry barriers, 
trade intensity and taxation, has been done by Miller and Parkhe (1998). While similar 
research is not likely to be done about Russian companies due to data discrepancy, the 
hypotheses about determinants of banks’ expansion might give insights into non-US 
banks’ behaviour.
To summarize what has been said about existing literature, there are some works 
adapting classic FDI theories to emerging economies in general and to Russia in 
particular. Also, there is a significant number of works dedicated to internationalization 
of Russian economy as a whole, or some particular industries, mostly RB. As a matter 
of fact, there has been an effect of ‘overshadowing’ NRB industries: international 
activities of companies representing the latter have been traditionally not paid enough 
attention to and seen as negligible, while ideas gained by generalization of RB industries 
observations were spread onto the whole Russian economy. While the international 
activities of banks have drawn researchers’ attention, there is a very limited number of 
works dedicated to Russian banking sector specifically. This, due to the rising importance 
of the phenomenon, is an issue that we believe needs to be addressed.
Research questions and methodology
There are arguments for the banks acting in a similar way to RB companies due to several 
reasons, namely: state control over banking industry (either direct through ownership 
or indirect through informal ties or political pressure), strict legislation and connection 
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to resource companies via ownership or business connections. The last point might 
require clarification: in a central-planned economy all business enterprises function 
not as business entities but as departments of a ‘megaenterprise’ – the state; it means 
that some ties between companies (including foreign ones after the dissolution of the 
USSR) could be inherited from the soviet times.
Hence, this paper is going to answer the following research questions:
1. What are the main destinations for foreign expansion of Russian banks and what 
determines the choice of them?
2. What foreign entry modes are commonly used by Russian banks and why?
3. Is the internationalization process of Russian banking industry similar to that of 
RB industries or not?
Our research is conducted in two main stages:
preliminary study of Russian banking sector internationalization;•	
case analysis.•	
In the first stage we examine data on Russian companies’ foreign activities 
(geographical spread and major deals from companies’ own data, Rosstat and the Central 
Bank of Russia) to recognize the basic patterns. Also, we select the banks for future study 
using Zephyr database on M&As and other deals by Bureau van Dijk. During the first 
stage we have chosen the deals where a Russian bank acts as a purchaser of a foreign 
credit institution and cleared the list of the deals which there was no quantitative 
data on. Also, we did not include the purchases made by Vneshekonombank and the 
Central Bank of Russia, as these are actually government agencies de facto (which 
is reflected in their founding documents, mission, etc.) and not state owned banks. 
The results show that Sberbank, VTB, Alfa-Bank and Gazprombank account for 
almost 90% of cross-border M&A deal value by Russian banks in the past ten years. 
This, as a proof of external activities’ concentration, combined with the fact that the 
Russian banking sector is very concentrated internally with five major banks (the four 
mentioned above plus Russian Standard) having control of 47.9% of all sector’s assets 
and 52.2% of capital allows us to believe that conclusions derived from the case studies 
of Sberbank, VTB, Alfa-Bank and Gazprombank are applicable to the whole sector in 
terms of internationalization.
In the second stage we move on to the case study, where we investigate the 
international activities of the chosen banks to answer the research questions.
a closer look at banking
On one hand most internationalizing Russian banks are state-owned and even more: 
closely affiliated with RB companies, on the other hand they use completely different 
strategy of organic growth without obvious signs of political push in most cases. 
Moreover, if RB companies often have their deals backed by the government, banks do 
not always have that privilege. Moreover, banks cannot use export as an entry mode. 
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Still, they manage to operate working chains of subsidiaries on foreign retail markets, 
which indicates that their presence on foreign markets is not merely a support for 
business activities of their parent companies.
sberbank
Sberbank has the largest countrywide branch network with 18 regional head offices and 
more than 19,100 retail outlets with about 245,600 employees. Worldwide Sberbank 
operates subsidiaries in Kazakhstan and Ukraine and plans to expand into Belarus, China 
and India. Sberbank is engaged in international activities through direct settlement 
agreements, correspondent accounts with over 220 foreign credit institutions, trade 
finance operations and membership in a number of international financial organizations. 
As of April 16, 2010, the Central Bank of Russia owned 60.3% of Sberbank’s ordinary 
shares and 57.6% of its total share capital, being Sberbank’s controlling shareholder. 
The remaining shares are held by more than 263,000 institutional and private investors. 
Non-resident ownership of about 32% suggests Sberbank’s shares are a compelling 
investment.
In its foreign market entry activities the bank focuses on establishing representative 
offices or subsidiary branches. Key aspects of Sberbank’s internationalization are 
summarized in Table 1.
TABLE 1. summary of sberbank’s foreign activities 
Main destinations for expansion CIS, Eastern Europe, China, India
notable assets abroad TeksakaBank (Kazakhstan), Bank NRB (Ukraine), 
Belpromstroibank (Belarus)
Subsidiaries in China, India
Preferred entry modes Establishing subsidiaries, brownfield investments
expansion approach Expanding subsidiary network via greenfield/brownfield 
investments, only major deals supported by government
ownership State-owned
Vneshtorgbank (VtB)
The VTB Group has developed over the past two decades into a universal financial 
and banking institution with a leading position in Russia and a constantly expanding 
presence in the CIS, Western Europe, Africa and Asia. VTB holds the second place 
in Russia in terms of assets, capital, funding base, corporate and retail lending, with 
authorized capital of around $3.6 bn. As of October 01, 2009 VTB’s assets reached 
around $93 bn. According to 2008 results, the VTB was placed the 70th among the 
world’s largest banks.
VTB has two subsidiary banks in Russia, a number of financial companies (VTB 
Leasing, VTB Insurance, VTB Capital, etc.), subsidiary banks in the CIS countries, as 
well as several banks in Western Europe. VTB is a shareholder of the East-West United 
Bank (Luxembourg), the Ost-West Handelsbank (Frankfurt-am-Main) and the Donau-
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Bank (Vienna). VTB was the first Russian bank to obtain a license to carry out banking 
activities in India and China and to open its branches in these two countries;  VTB also 
services bank cards of UnionPay, a Chinese national processing company. Key aspects 
of VTB’s internationalization are summarized in Table 2.
TABLE 2. summary of VtB’s foreign activities
Main destinations for expansion CIS, Western Europe
notable assets abroad VTB-founded Russian Commercial Bank (Switzerland, 
Cyprus)
Subsidiaries in China, India
Shares in Donau-Bank (Austria), East-West United Bank 
(Luxembourg), Ost-West Handelsbank (Germany)
Preferred entry modes Establishing subsidiaries
expansion approach Organic growth through expanding subsidiary network, 
government involvement at critical points
ownership State-owned
alfa-Bank
Alfa-Bank is the part of Alfa Group – the Russian largest privately owned financial-
industrial conglomerate, with interests in oil and gas, commercial and investment 
banking, asset management, insurance, retail trade, telecommunications, media and 
others. Alfa-Bank has more than 200 branches in Russia, the CIS, the Netherlands, the 
UK and the United States. 
The bank usually invests in projects where it can have the majority stake or an equal 
control. Foreign investors provide the bank with not only capital, but also the expertise 
which is needed to successfully develop and realize the bank’s investment projects. Key 
aspects of Alfa-Bank’s internationalization are summarized in Table 3.
TABLE 3. summary of alfa-Bank’s foreign activities 
Main destinations for expansion CIS, Western Europe
notable assets abroad Amsterdam Trade Bank N.V. (Netherlands)
Subsidiaries in CIS, US
Preferred entry modes Establishing subsidiaries, purchase of major shares
expansion approach Careful expansion via greenfield/brownfield investments 
into CIS or developed markets without state support, hence 
the affinity to maximizing control
ownership Private
gazprombank
Gazprombank has operated in the banking market since 1990. Founded by the world’s 
largest gas producer and exporter Gazprom, Gazprombank has become one of the 
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leaders in the banking sector, while key performance indicators place it among the top 
three banks of Russia. Gazprombank invests and lends to companies in major sectors of 
the economy – oil and petrochemical industry, metallurgy, machinery, nuclear industry, 
electric power industry, real estate construction, transport, telecommunications and 
trade. Gazprombank actively develops areas closely related to the investment business. 
Besides strategic investments in oil-and-gas, petrochemical industries, and media-
business, in Russia Gazprombank occupies leading positions in transactions in the 
capital markets (bonds underwriting, arranging financing for clients), corporate finance 
advisory and project finance. 
At present, Gazprombank operates 43 subsidiary banks in Russia, owns branches 
in Armenia, Belarus and Switzerland, representative offices in China and Mongolia, 
and other assets in Western Europe. The total number of offices delivering banking and 
depository services under the single brand name of Gazprombank exceeds 500. Key 
aspects of Gazprombank’s internationalization are summarized in Table 4.
TABLE 4. summary of gazprombank’s foreign activities 
Main destinations for expansion CIS, Europe
notable assets abroad IDF Anlagegesellschaft (Liechtenstein), Arosgas Holding AG 
(Austria)
Shares in European gas-related companies
Preferred entry modes Brownfield/greenfield investment
expansion approach Clearly biased towards parent company interests in gas 
industry and portfolio investments
ownership State-owned
When analyzing foreign activities of major Russian banks it becomes clear that 
Vneshtorgbank’s, Sberbank’s and Alfa-bank’s foreign activities are very similar in their 
key characteristics: main destinations, preferred entry modes and expansion approach, 
while Gazprombank’s activities stand out. The former is reflected in the choice of the 
CIS countries as the main expansion destination with some attempts to enter Western 
European countries and sometimes China and India, as well as greenfield/brownfield 
investments being the main instrument in building foreign subsidiary networks. The 
latter can be explained by the fact that Gazprombank was clearly following its parent 
company’s lead, often serving as an investment agent, hence the interest in gas industry 
enterprises and investment funds; second, its deals had more political traces surrounding 
them than the deals of other banks, and third, its activities clearly lacked the signs of 
establishing a large subsidiary network and retail orientation present in other banks’ 
activities. This might be explained by ‘too close’ relation to Gazprom and this allows 
us to treat Gazprombank as an agent of Gazprom, excluding it from the banking sector 
study.
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findings & Discussion
The pattern formed by the studied banks’ (except Gazprombank) activities leads us to 
the following conclusions. First of all, the choice of destinations for expansion might 
be a result of business motives or caused by environmental constraints. Affinity to the 
CIS, EU and BRIC countries’ markets is likely to be caused by traditionally close ties, 
some brand awareness and other Russian companies’ activities on the CIS markets 
and high demand for financial services in developed or rapidly developing economies; 
in this respect banks behave like a typical NRB company. Environmental constraints 
mentioned above include direct legal regulations encouraging banks to invest in 
developed economies and inner legislative and political instability prompting to look 
for safer expansion destinations. If it is the business motives that direct the expansion of 
Russian banks, then the saturation of current favourite markets or raising attractiveness 
of others will make the banks look for other destinations and might not have severe 
negative effects on their expansion; but if it is the environmental constraints that prevail, 
then Russian banks might face a problem when they are in need for new markets.
Second, the choice of establishing subsidiary networks as an entry mode is arguably 
a forced one. The nature of financial services combined with Russian economic 
environment makes export or other ‘low-involvement’ options like licensing impossible, 
whereas the same unstable environment encourages banks to look for total control over 
their foreign operations. While the example of VTB shows that attempts to establish 
wholly-owned subsidiaries on developed markets can be successful, it is unlikely that 
without improvement of local business conditions allowing for lesser control Russian 
banks could go on with the same enthusiasm.
Third, the careful overall expansion approach is again the result of domestic business 
environment. In order to switch to more aggressive behaviour and try to expand into 
less developed markets or give up striving for total control over operations there have 
to be serious improvements in Russian economic environment, while more effective 
entry into developed markets requires the same to attract clients. As we see, all key 
characteristics of Russian banks’ expansion are more or less dependent on domestic 
economic conditions.
Initially, banks clearly stand out among the NRB companies; on one hand, most 
largest banks are state-owned and sometimes even affiliated with resource giants with 
the liquidity surplus being even more apparent than in the latter; on the other hand, 
unlike the latter, they do not have the export option when entering foreign market 
and have to physically establish their presence. Besides, in most countries banking is 
considered a very sensitive area requiring strict regulation thus limiting the usefulness 
of the governmental support . In addition, strict regulation in this case has a side-effect: 
common measures of international activity, such as transnationality index become 
useless, as the value of foreign assets, for example, indicates not the financial position 
of the company but the restrictions in place. As with the other service industries, the 
number of personnel abroad, the number of deals with foreign agents and the indirect 
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ways of assessing company performance also show a distorted picture thus making 
performance evaluation and comparison a tricky task by itself.
In comparison to companies from other industries, banks have proven to be 
rather conservative investors. Expansion to well-known CIS countries in the form of 
establishing subsidiaries was the most popular choice of internationalization path for 
most cases followed by expansion to stable Western European and the US markets and, 
in some cases China and India. This might be considered a wise move, as Russian banks 
definitely need their domestic clients. Despite initial position being more alike to RB 
companies, in their expansion Russian banks are behaving like a typical NRB company 
with the exception of entry mode choice, which is forced by the nature of financial 
services.
Another interesting feature of Russian banks’ internationalization was their affinity 
to building subsidiary networks and general orientation on retail customers instead 
of simply following large Russian companies and servicing their needs. This, along 
with very limited compared to other industries political accompaniment, suggests 
that Russian banks’ foreign expansion is actually an economic phenomenon and not 
a political one. One could say that it is not the government who uses banks it owns to 
achieve its goals but vice versa (when it is appropriate).
RefeRences
Bank of Russia. (2010). Russian Federation: outward foreign direct investments of nonbanking 
corporations, by country, retrieved December 10 from http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/print.
aspx?file=credit_statistics/inv_out-country_e.htm
Dopico, L.G., & Wilcox J.A. (2002). Openness, profit opportunities and foreign banking. Jour-
nal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 12(4-5), 299-320.
Dunning, J.H. (1986). The investment development cycle revisited. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 
122(4), 667-677.
Dunning, J.H., & Feng Z. (2008). Foreign direct investment and the locational competitiveness 
of countries. Transnational Corporations, 17(3), 1-30.
Filatotchev, I., Buck, T., & Wright, M. (2007a). Soviet all-union enterprises as new multination-
als of the CIS. The International Executive, 35(6), 525-538.
Filatotchev, I., Strange, R, Piesse, J., & Lien, Y.-Ch. (2007b). FDI by firms from newly industr-
ialised economies in emerging markets: corporate governance, entry mode and location. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 38(4), 556-73.
Filippov, S. (2008). Russian emerging multinationals: trends and issues. UNU-MERIT (United 
Nations University and Maastricht University), Working Papers, No 062, Maastricht, the Nether-
lands.
Kalotay, K. (2006). Outward foreign direct investment from Russia in a global context. Journal 
of East-West Business, 11(3-4), 9-22.
King, R., Hill, M., & Cornforth, J. (1995). From red multinationals to capitalist entrepreneurs? 
European Journal of Marketing, 29(13), 6-22.
Kobrin, S. (1979). The expropriation of natural resource-based investment in the developing 
countries: 1960-1976. Journal of Business Administration, 11(1,2), 221-239.
74 
Liuhto, K., & Vahtra, P. (2007). Foreign operations of Russia’s largest industrial corporations – 
building a typology. Transnational Corporations, 16(1), 28-36.
Makhija, M. V. (1993). Government intervention in the Venezuelan petroleum industry: An 
empirical investigation of political risk. Journal of International Business Studies, 24(3), 531-555.
Meyer, K. E. (2001). Institutions, transaction costs, and entry mode choice in Eastern Europe. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 32(2), 357-367.
Miller, S., & Parkhe, A. (1998). Patterns in the expansion of U.S. banks’ foreign operations. Jour-
nal of International Business Studies, 29(2), 359-390.
Panibratov, A. (2009). Internationalization process of Russian construction industry: inward 
investments perspective. Journal for East European Management Studies, 2, 210-228.
Panibratov, A., & Kalotay, K. (2009). Russian outward FDI and its policy context, in Columbia FDI 
Profiles, Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, Columbia University, 1.
Petrou, A. (2007). Multinational banks from developing versus developed countries: Compet-
ing in the same arena? Journal of International Management, 13(3), 376-397.
Qian, L., & Delios, A. (2008). Internalization and experience: Japanese banks’ international ex-
pansion, 1980-1998. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(2), 231-249.
Ramamurti, R. (2004). Developing countries and MNEs: extending and enriching the research 
agenda. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(4), 277-283.
Ramamurti, R. (2008). What have we learned about emerging-market MNEs? In Ramamurti & 
Singh (Eds.). Emerging Multinationals from Emerging Markets (pp.399-426). Cambridge University 
Press.
Rasiah, R., Gammeltoft, P., & Jiang, Y. (2010). Home government policies for outward FDI 
from emerging economies: lessons from Asia. International Journal of Emerging Markets, 5(3/4), 
333-357.
Roolaht, T., & Varblane U. (2009). The inward-outward dynamics in the internationalisation of 
Baltic banks. Baltic Journal of Management, 4(2), 221-242.
Rosstat. (2009). Rossiyskiy statisticheskiy yezhegodnik 2009 (Russian Statistical Yearbook).
Rugman, A.M., & Brain, C. (2004). The regional nature of the world’s banking sector. Multina-
tional Business Review, 12(3), 5-22.
Rugman, A. M., & Verbeke, A. (1998). Multinational enterprises and public policy. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 29(1), 115-136.
Ruhr, M. von der, & Ryan, M. (2005). ’Following’ or ‘attracting’ the customer? Japanese bank-
ing FDI in Europe. Atlantic Economic Journal, 33(4), 405-422.
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). (2006).  The Russians are coming: understanding emerg-
ing multinationals. London: EIU.
UNCTAD. (2009). World investment report 2009: transnational corporations, agricultural produc-
tion and development. New York and Geneva.
Vahtra, P., & Liuhto, K. (2005). Russian corporations abroad—seeking profits, leverage or ref-
uge? In Liuhto, K., Vincze, Z. (Eds.). Wider Europe (pp. 225-254). Turku: Turku School of Econom-
ics and Business Administration.
Vahtra, P., & Liuhto, K. (2006). An overview of Russia’s largest corporations abroad. In Liuh-
to, K. (Ed.). Expansion or Exodus – Why do Russian Corporations Invest Abroad? (pp.23-40). Inter-
national Business Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1990). Transaction cost economics. In R. Schmalensee, & R. Willig (Eds.), 
Handbook of industrial organization, 1, 135-182.
